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In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of policy measures adopted by Chile and Colombia 
aiming to mitigate the deleterious effects of pro-cyclical capital flows. In the case of Chile, 
according to our GMM analysis, capital controls succeeded in reducing net short-term capital 
flows, but did not affect long-term flows. As far as Colombia is concerned, the regulations were 
capable of affecting total flows and also long-term ones. In addition, our co-integration models 
indicate that the regulations did not have a direct effect on the real exchange rate in the Chilean 
case. Nonetheless, the model used for Colombia did detect a direct impact of the capital controls 
on the real exchange rate. Therefore, our results do not seem to support the idea that those 
regulations were easily evaded. 
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The excessive liquidity in international capital markets during the 1990s posed 
several challenges to policymakers in emerging economies. Among numerous issues, the 
links between financial volatility and short-term capital flows were a particular source of 
concern. In addition, problems associated with moral hazard, fragility in financial 
intermediaries’ and corporate balance sheets, asset price bubbles, consumption booms 
and real exchange rate overvaluation were intimately connected to the boom-bust cycle in 
international capital flows to developing countries following the financial liberalization 
process.  
In this context, it became evident that full capital account openness can be associated 
with increased macroeconomic volatility and limitations in degrees of freedom for 
domestic policy makers, particularly when capital flows are strongly pro-cyclical. These 
facts prompted a number of countries to (re)-adopt capital account regulations. Our 
interest at present lies in examining the imposition of price-based capital account 
management polices in Chile and Colombia since the early 1990s. The aims of those 
regulations included reducing the costs of sterilization policies and the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate associated with large capital inflows and increasing the autonomy of 
domestic monetary policy.  
This paper intends to evaluate the effectiveness of those regulations in attaining some 
of these goals. In particular, we will concentrate on the effects of the reserve 
requirements on capital flows and on the real exchange rate. This task presents several 
difficulties. Cordella (2003) argues that those “taxes” on inflows may either increase or 
decrease the supply of flows depending on two counteracting forces. On the one hand, if 
those policies are successful in changing the composition of external liabilities and in 
reducing the vulnerability to crises, they could in fact generate larger long-term capital 
inflows, since risk-adjusted yields may increase. On the other hand, the direct decrease in 
returns from investing in the country (due to the tax) and the increase in the irreversibility 
of the investment have a negative impact on capital inflows.  
We will analyze creditor-based data at a monthly frequency that has not been used 
previously to evaluate the capital account regulations. There are two main advantages in 
using this dataset. The capital flows recorded are arguably less likely to be subject to   3
evasion or re-labelling than official data from the respective central banks. The reserve 
requirements were imposed on the borrower’s part of the transaction, hence it might be 
the case that there were less incentives for lenders to incorrectly report the nature of the 
capital account transaction with the objective of evading the controls. In addition, as far 
as Colombia is concerned, the official statistics on capital flows from the Balanza 
Cambiaria do not discriminate between flows of different maturities. Our data allow for a 
direct analysis of the effect of capital account regulations on the maturity structure of 
flows, which has proved to be difficult in the past. In any case, the analysis of a different 
dataset might prove to be a useful exercise in comparison with the previous literature on 
the subject. Nonetheless, a major drawback is that the data only encompasses capital 
flows from and to the United States.  
The paper is divided into 5 sections. In the second section we discuss the 
macroeconomic environment that prevailed in Chile and Colombia during the 1990s and 
the capital account policies adopted. Subsequently, in section 3, we briefly survey the 
previous literature on the Chilean and Colombian capital controls. In the fourth section, 
we present evidence from Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regressions and 
Vector Error Correction models (VECM) in order to assess the effects of the price-based 
capital controls on capital flows and on the real exchange rate. The final section presents 
the conclusions obtained.  
 
2. Capital Controls in Chile and Colombia 
 
The restoration of democracy in 1990 probably marked the start of the period of 
greatest prosperity in Chilean history. Chile’s macroeconomic performance and stable 
environment led the country to be granted an investment grade status by the rating agency 
Standard & Poor’s in 1992. In fact, it is necessary to place the Chilean price-based capital 
controls in a wider context. They were an integral part of a macroeconomic policy 
strategy that allowed Chilean authorities to sustain the crawling band exchange rate 
regime and target interest rates to stabilize domestic prices, while reducing the excessive 
pressure that those high interest rates put on the exchange rate.    4
The Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) on capital inflows was imposed in 
June 1991 at a rate of 20% with the objective of coping with the “mixed blessings” of 
large capital inflows. This market-based policy acted as an “asymmetric tax” (falling 
more heavily on short-term capital inflows) and was accompanied by other prudential 
measures (such as size limits on foreign bond issues by domestic intermediaries) and an 
extensive liberalization of capital outflows. Laban & Larrain (2000) argue that the 
liberalization of outflows might encourage further capital inflows due to the reduction in 
the irreversibility of investing in the country. Nevertheless, it could also facilitate “runs” 
in bad times, which effectively occurred when domestic pension funds were responsible 
for large capital outflows in 1998. In any case, given the pro-cyclicality of capital flows, 
the latter effect seems to outweigh the former one. 
A detailed description of changes in capital account regulations in Chile is presented 
in Appendix B. The private sector was constantly looking for ways to circumvent the 
controls (De Gregorio et al., 2000), while the Central Bank authorities tried to close 
loopholes
i. In 1998, in the midst of the turmoil caused by the difficulties in Russia, the 
unremunerated reserve requirement was reduced to 10% and, in September of that year, it 
was finally set to zero. Subsequently, in June 2001, the Chilean authorities decided to 
abolish the controls on inflows altogether.  
The economic liberalization process in Colombia started in the early 1990s, when 
severe political and social turmoil precipitated the adoption of “structural” reforms, 
initially marked by the elimination of most quantitative controls on imports, followed by 
a gradual but rapid reduction of tariffs and the liberalization of foreign lending in 
February 1992. As in the Chilean case, the return of large capital inflows to the country 
from the early 1990s onwards marked a period of real exchange rate appreciation.  
The Colombian authorities opted to move toward more flexible, price-based capital 
account regulations from September 1993, rather than adopting full capital account 
convertibility or maintaining “old-style” administrative capital controls (Appendix B 
presents a description of the evolution of those regulations). The rationale for the 
adoption of controls on capital inflows by the Colombian authorities is analogous to the 
reasons that were put forward by Chilean policymakers.    5
The reserve requirements and minimum maturities changed frequently over the 
1990s; in fact, the Colombian restrictions were far more complex than the Chilean ones 
and the level of the tax equivalent of the unremunerated deposits was significantly higher. 
This suggests that the Colombian authorities pursued a more active management policy, 
as far as the capital account is concerned, when compared to Chile and/or it could reflect 
the greater relative instability of the Colombian economy and the political strength of the 
export sector. In addition, the complexity of the capital controls arguably increased 
uncertainty and speculation, as financial market players attempted to anticipate changes 
in the regulations.  
 
3. A Survey of the Econometric Literature on the Controls on Inflows 
 
Nadal de Simone & Sorsa (1999) provided an extensive review of the early 
econometric work on the effects of the unremunerated reserve requirements on capital 
flows in Chile. The studies considered by those authors presented some evidence that the 
URR was capable of altering the composition of capital flows towards long-term flows, 
but there was only mixed evidence that the URR has affected the level of total flows. 
Nonetheless, the econometric methodology used in most cases suffered from several 
shortcomings. Misspecification problems abounded (evidence of heterocedasticity, serial 
correlation, non-normality of the residuals, etc.) and a variety of authors failed to test for 
the non-stationarity of variables included in the regressions and for co-integration.  
Edwards (1999) estimated a series of unrestricted VAR models and concluded that 
the taxes on capital flows had been unsuccessful in reducing the real exchange rate 
appreciation. De Gregorio et al. (2000) also considered VAR systems and found that the 
URR had large and significant negative effects on short-term inflows; nevertheless, it 
also had a positive effect on long-term inflows (and overall no effect on total flows). 
Their impulse response functions indicated that the URR only had transitory effects on 
the real exchange rate. The latter result is confirmed by Gallego et al. (2002), who 
estimated a two-step error-correction model for the real exchange rate, combining 
determinants of the equilibrium in non-traded goods markets and interest rate 
differentials.    6
Forbes (2002) has attempted to estimate one of the possible costs of the URR. Using a 
Tobin’s q framework and an Euler equation for a panel of Chilean publicly traded 
companies from 1988 to 2000, this author concluded that smaller traded firms were more 
financially constrained than larger firms as a consequence of the policy. This conclusion 
has been confirmed by a study by Gallego & Hernandez (2003) on the microeconomic 
effects of the controls, which examined the financial statements of 73 Chilean firms from 
1986 to 2001. One has to acknowledge that it is evident that the URR had its costs; 
nonetheless, those studies do not consider that it was precisely the objective of the policy 
to limit the access to foreign finance (i.e. the exposure) of firms that are more likely to 
have unhedged foreign currency debt and are more financially fragile (subject to 
bankruptcy from capital flow reversals or sudden stops). Smaller firms are more likely to 
fall into those categories.  
The econometric literature on the Colombian capital account regulations has focused 
its attention on their impact on the level and composition of net capital inflows and, to a 
smaller extent, on the effect of the regulations on the real exchange rate and domestic 
interest rates. In addition to the usual technical econometric difficulties in analyzing those 
issues, in the Colombian case, the shortcomings of the empirical analysis are 
compounded by the lack of appropriate high frequency balance of payments statistics 
covering the period during which the controls were in place.  
Cardenas and Barrera (1997), using data from 1985 to 1996, analyzed the 
effectiveness of the controls in terms of their impact on the level and composition of 
capital flows. They estimated simple OLS regressions for capital flows to Colombia on a 
proxy of the external environment, interest rate differentials, fundamentals and measures 
of the tax equivalent of the deposit requirements and found that the URR has been 
successful in tilting the maturity structure of inflows towards long-term flows, but did not 
reduce the total volume of capital flows. Cardenas and Steiner (2000) updated the data set 
that was used by Cardenas and Barreras and they ran a simple Chow test to determine if 
the reserve requirements changed the composition of inflows in favor of long-term flows 
and concluded that the deposit requirements were effective in doing so. 
Ocampo and Tovar (1999) used Vector Error-Correction and State-Space models to 
estimate the effects of the deposit requirements on capital flows and found that the price-  7
based controls were effective in reducing the total volume of capital inflows. Rincon 
(1999) used monthly data from September 1993 to June 1998 on net flows of short-term 
capital to the private sector from the foreign exchange balance and from the “cuentas de 
compensacion” in order to assess the effects of the capital controls and concluded that the 
controls were effective in reducing short-term capital inflows. 
Rincon & Villar (2000) performed an indirect test for the effect of the URR on the 
real exchange rate, using a single equation co-integration procedure (Engle-Granger) to 
determine the behavior of the latter variable. They concluded that, since capital flows 
affected the behavior of the real exchange rate, the URR had a significant indirect impact 
on that variable.  
To sum up, the econometric literature on the capital controls in Chile seems to present 
rather positive results on the effectiveness of the deposit requirements in terms of 
reducing short-term inflows and increasing monetary policy autonomy. Nonetheless, the 
results concerning the effects of capital controls on the real exchange rate and on total 
capital flows are inconclusive so far. In the Colombian case, there is evidence of the 
effectiveness of the controls in reducing the total volume of flows. The econometric 
analysis of the impact of the URR on the maturity structure of flows is hampered by the 
lack of high frequency data distinguishing short-term from medium and long-term flows.  
 
4. Data, Econometric Specifications and Results  
 
The sources and definitions for the variables used in the empirical part are described 
in Appendix C. The data on capital flows at a monthly frequency employed in this study 
refers to bilateral capital flows between the U.S. and the two countries (including bond, 
equity, bank loans and other securities, as detailed below) compiled by the U.S. Treasury 
Department in its international capital reports (TIC) system
ii. Information is collected 
from commercial banks and other depository institutions, bank holding companies, 
securities brokers and dealers, and non-banking enterprises in the United States, 
including the U.S. branches, agencies and subsidiaries of foreign-based banks and 
business enterprises.    8
These data constitute an alternative creditor-based source that allows us to 
discriminate between flows of different maturities. In the TIC dataset, long-term 
securities refer to securities with an original maturity of more than one year. Short-term 
capital flows compiled in the TIC system include liabilities and claims arising from 
deposits due to or from foreign entities, financial instruments with an original maturity of 
one year or less, borrowings from foreigners and loans and other credits to foreigners
iii. 
As we pointed out previously, for Colombia the balanza cambiaria does not provide 
information on the maturity structure of flows, which renders the analysis of the effect of 
the controls on the maturity of capital flows particularly difficult.  
A crucial question, when assessing the impact of the price-based regulations on 
inflows, is the appropriate measurement of the tax-equivalent of the reserve requirement. 
A “naïve” measure of this tax, which is constructed by combining an arbitrage condition 
and the uncovered interest parity equation, is widely used in the literature. Consider the 
case where the maturity of the loan (capital inflow) k  is larger than the holding period of 
the deposit requirement (h). Assuming that the exchange rate is fixed, the uncovered 
interest parity would take the form: 
δ + + = + ) 1 ( ) 1 (
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Where i is the domestic interest rate, 
* i  is the international interest rate and δ
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equivalent of the reserve requirement. The following arbitrage equation is also used: 
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where  u  is the unremunerated reserve requirement. The above expression simply 
states that the return from investing in Chile/Colombia (considering the reserve 
requirements) has to be equal to the return obtained from investing abroad, i.e. the 
international interest rate (opportunity cost). Using the UIP condition to substitute for 
domestic interest rates and using the approximation that  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( xj j
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Note that the tax-equivalent is inversely related to the maturity of the capital inflow 
(k )
iv. This measure of the tax equivalent does not take the country risk premium into   9
account and does not consider variations in the exchange rate. In our analysis, we will 
adopt a measure of the tax-equivalent cost that incorporates those factors. Firstly, we will 
consider the case where the holding period of the deposit (h) is equal to the maturity of 
the loan (k ). The UIP condition at present is given by: 
) 1 )( 1 )( 1 *)( 1 ( ) 1 ( δ λ + Δ + + + = +
e S i i                                    
where  λ  is the country risk premium and ΔS
e is the expected change in the exchange 
rate. The arbitrage condition is given by: 
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where the term of the left-hand side is the opportunity cost of the investment decision 
(foreign interest rate plus country and currency risk), the first term on the right-hand side 
represents the returns on the amount actually invested (i.e. minus the reserve 
requirements) and the second term represents possible capital gains (or losses) from 
changes in the exchange rate. By manipulating those two equations we can obtain the 
following result: 
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Note that the same formula is valid for the case when the holding period of the 
deposit requirement is larger than the maturity of the loan, i.e. the case where  k h > . This 
occurs because the arbitrage condition is: 
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By manipulating this expression we obtain: 
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Now we will proceed to calculating the tax equivalent when  k h <  i.e. when the 
maturity of the investment is larger than the holding period of the reserve requirement. If 
we assume that the proceeds of the deposit requirement are reinvested abroad,  the 
arbitrage condition becomes: 
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By manipulating this we obtain: 
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Evidently, those measures only constitute a proxy for the costs of the reserve 
requirements and depend on a certain number of restrictive assumptions. In the empirical 
implementations, we decided to use an average of the tax equivalent variable for different 
maturities and we experimented with different measures for the expected rate of 
exchange rate depreciation (or appreciation)
v.  
The theoretical foundations of the regressions estimated in this section can be found 
in the models of capital flows to developing countries surveyed in Fitzgerald (2002) and 
Mody & Taylor (2002). We included variables identified as important in the literature on 
the determinants of capital flows focusing on push and pull factors (Agenor & Montiel, 
1999), such as domestic and foreign interest rates. In addition, we tried to capture the 
important role of information asymmetries in determining capital flows by including the 
U.S. junk bond spread in the regressions following (Mody & Taylor, 2002). In fact, those 
authors argue that the high yield spread is important in explaining the supply of flows to 
emerging markets, partly because default risk in the U.S. could be correlated to default 
risk in emerging markets, but also because the empirical evidence shows that a rise in the 
high-yield spread is capable of predicting a slowdown in real economic activity, which is 
consistent with financial accelerator models (Gertler & Lown, 1999). This predicted 
slowdown in economic activity could lead to a reduction in net capital flows. 
Moreover, and from the viewpoint of micro level portfolio choice, Fitzgerald (2002) 
argues that the high yield spread may capture endogenous cycles in foreign investor’s 
risk tendencies. We also introduce lags of capital flows as an explanatory variable with 
the objective of capturing herding, inertia or bandwagon effects that may arise in 
international capital markets in the face of asymmetric information and bounded 
rationality.  
It is clear that endogeneity problems are likely to arise in the estimation of equations 
describing capital flows. In addition, right-hand-side variables are also measured with 
error. In this context, it is likely that the residuals of the regression will be correlated with   11
the explanatory variables, which implies that OLS estimates would be biased and 
inconsistent. We will tackle this problem by estimating regressions using the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) technique. In order to apply this technique, it is necessary to 
impose orthogonality conditions between the explanatory variables and the error term.  
Note that GMM is a robust estimator and does not require assumptions about the 
exact distribution of data generating process (unlike Maximum Likelihood estimators). 
When implementing our GMM models we correct for heterocedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form by using Andrews weights to ensure that the variance-
covariance matrix estimated is positive definite. In addition, we use the J-statistic 
obtained from the regressions to test for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions 
imposed, in order to ensure that the instruments used are adequate.  
 
4.1 The Effect of the Reserve Requirements on Capital Inflows  
 
The central question that most of the empirical literature on the effects of the reserve 
requirements attempts to address is their direct effects on net capital inflows. We will try 
to tackle this issue by estimating log-linear models for capital flows as a function of the 
interest rate differential, the junk bond spread and the tax equivalent of the reserve 
requirements. The models are estimated over the period from January 1991 to December 
2000
vi. The unit root tests for the variables included in the model (presented in Appendix 
A) reveal that most of the series are stationary with the exception of net short-term 
inflows, the terms of trade and the tax equivalent of the reserve requirements. 
Hence, we will focus on net total and net long-term capital flows, as those series seem 
to be the ones for which we can be fairly certain that a unit root is not present and 
therefore the application of the GMM technique is adequate. Furthermore, following a 
strand of the literature on capital flows (Agenor et al. 2002); we include the interest 
differential, the junk bond spread and the tax equivalent series in first differences. We 
justify this choice for two reasons. The first one relates to the need to get rid of unit root 
problems. In addition, since we are dealing with capital flows, it is intuitive that changes 
in those series are more relevant than simply looking at the levels. Hence, we estimate the 
following functional form (using the same notation as in previous sections), where κ  is   12
log of net capital flows, cis the constant, ω is the interest differential, φ is the junk bond 
spread and ε is the random error term.  
t t t t t t c ε φ β δ β ω β κ β κ + + Δ + + Δ + + Δ + + = − ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( 4 3 2 1 1  
The results obtained for the regression of net total capital flows to Chile are presented 
in Table 1. We used lags of net total flows, lags of the reserve requirement, lags of the 
interest rate differential, lags of the real exchange rate gap (cyclical component of the real 
exchange rate), the log of world oil prices, changes in the log of the terms of trade, the 
trade balance and lags of changes in the high-yield spread as instruments.  
The estimates obtained are autocorrelation and heterocedasticity consistent. The 
relatively high R-square indicates a good fit. The J-test statistic does not reject the 
validity of the instruments. There is evidence of non-normality of the residuals, but as we 
mentioned before this is not preoccupying in the GMM framework. Most coefficients are 
significant at conventional levels and present the expected signs. Furthermore, the model 
suggests that total net capital flows are highly responsive to changes in the URR. Since 
the model is specified in logs, estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities; 
hence it seems that one unit increases in the tax equivalent would reduce capital flows by 
40% in this case. One should also note that a one-off shock to the first difference of the 
tax rate is equal to a permanent shock to the level of the tax rate. 
Subsequently, we build a similar model for net long-term capital inflows to Chile, 
including the same explanatory variables and similar instruments as in the previous case. 
Once again, the J-test confirms the validity of the instruments. We found that the URR 
had no significant effect on net long-term capital flows, which is not surprising, since 
those flows were not the main target of the Chilean authorities. 
Hence, our results differ from the ones obtained by De Gregorio et al. (2000), who 
found that the URR actually increased long-term flows. They also differ from the 
conclusions reached by Lefort and Lehman (2000), who found that the URR decreased 
net long-term capital flows. This could be explained not only by the different dataset and 
tax equivalent measures used in our regressions, but also by the small sample size in the 
Le fort and Lehman paper and the fact that both studies are subject to misspecification 
problems (neither paper presents the relevant tests). In addition, both papers seem to   13
consider measures of long-term capital flows that include FDI, which was actually 
exempt from the controls, whereas our measure explicitly excludes this type of flows.  
We chose to estimate a similar model for capital flows to Colombia to facilitate the 
comparative analysis of the experience of the two countries. Table 3 presents the results 
of the estimation of the model for total net capital flows to Colombia for the period from 
January 1993 to December 2000
vii. Furthermore, we included lags of net capital flows, 
lags of the interest differential, lags of the tax equivalent of the reserve requirements, lags 
of the real exchange rate gap, lags of the high-yield spread, World oil prices and lags of 
the trade balance as instruments.  
The J-test does not reject the validity of the instruments. As in the Chilean case, the 
model suggests that total net capital flows were reduced by the reserve requirements. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the estimated elasticity is much smaller in the 
Colombian case (-7.47), indicating that flows were less sensitive to changes in the tax.  
The results for the estimation of the model for net long-term capital inflows to 
Colombia are presented in Table 4. The URR coefficient has the expected negative sign 
and is of approximately the same size as the URR coefficient in the equation for total net 
capital flows. It is also of interest to note that the interest rate differential term does not 
seem to help to explain long-term capital flows to Colombia, which probably reflects the 
fact that those flows are determined by factors such as institutional quality rather than 
simple market return differentials.  
Hence, we may conclude that, contrary to the Chilean case, the Colombian controls 
on capital inflows did have an effect on long-term capital flows. This can arguably be 
explained by the fact that the Colombian “tax rates” were also applied to medium-term 
flows. In fact, one has to bear in mind that our dataset classifies capital flows as long-
term when their maturity exceeds one year. Nonetheless, at several points in time, the 
Colombian authorities imposed high reserve requirements on capital inflows with 
maturities of 1.5 to 2 years. Moreover, the results indicate total capital flows to Colombia 
were much less sensitive to changes in the tax rate when compared to capital flows to 
Chile.    14
4.2 The Effect of the URR on the Real Exchange Rate 
 
The Chilean and Colombian authorities were concerned with the excessive 
appreciation of the real exchange rate that was associated with the surge in capital 
inflows of the 1990s and one of the objectives of the reserve requirements was to counter 
this tendency. Apart from the indirect effect of the URR on the real exchange rate 
through the reduction of capital inflows, one also has to consider the possible impact of 
the capital controls on expectations about the future exchange rate (and hence on the 
current exchange rate). 
In order to assess the effects of the URR on the real exchange rate, we decided to use 
the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) procedure proposed by (Pesaran et 
al., 2000) to analyze long-run co-integration relationships in a multivariate framework: 
through a vector error correction model (VECM)
viii. There are a number of preliminary 
issues that have to be addressed when using this approach for the modelling of long-run 
relationships. One fundamental problem is to make sure that all the variables that are 
included in the long-run co-integration relationship(s) are in fact non-stationary. Another 
crucial step is to model appropriately deterministic components (such as trends and 
intercepts) and whether to include I(1) and I(0) exogenous variables.  
In case exogenous variables are included in the model, the usual critical values for co-
integration tests have to be changed (the appropriate critical values were tabulated by 
Pesaran et al. ibid.). The final preliminary problem to be resolved is the selection of the 
lag-order of the underlying VAR model. Too many lags may lead to overparametrisation 
and two few to omitted variables and autocorrelation of the residuals.  
In the case of Chile, we estimate a model with a vector of  z  random variables as 
specified below, partitioned between endogenous and exogenous variables. The log level 
of the real exchange rate, the log of the terms of trade, the level of the tax equivalent, the 
ratio of government spending to GDP and the log of net foreign assets were considered as 
endogenous variables. We have also included the log of world oil prices and a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 after September 1999
ix as exogenous variables. Hence, the 
model is specified as follows: the first two terms on the right-hand-side of the expression   15
represent deterministic components,  i Γ  are short-run response matrices and  Π is the 
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Unit root tests for the variables are presented in Appendix A and indicate that the 
series included are non-stationary. After visual inspection of the series included, we 
estimated a model with unrestricted intercept and restricted trends, the Akaike 
information criterion suggests a model with two lags for that specification. Both the trace 
and maximum-eigenvalue statistics indicate only one co-integrating vector involving the 
variables considered above
x. Table 5 presents the maximum likelihood estimates for the 
co-integrating vector, where we normalized the coefficient of the real exchange rate to 1 
in order to identify the co-integration relationship. We decided to impose restrictions on 
the coefficients and test those sequentially following the procedure suggested by Pesaran 
et al. (2000).  
The coefficient for the tax equivalent of the reserve requirement turned out to be 
insignificant, as evidenced by the likelihood ratio test (LR test statistic of 0.003 and p-
value of 0.96). Hence, it seems that the URR did not have a direct long run effect on the 
real exchange rate in Chile, i.e. it was not capable of preventing the appreciation of the 
real exchange in the long run beyond the indirect effect through the reduction in net total 
capital inflows. We now examine the short-term dynamics of the model, by specifying an 
error correction model (Table 6). The relatively small coefficient of the error correction 
term suggests a slow adjustment towards equilibrium.  There is no evidence of non-
normality of the residuals and heterocedasticity, but there is some evidence of serial 
correlation; therefore, we present Newey-West corrected standard errors.  
The results indicate that the tax equivalent also failed to have a direct short-run effect 
on the real exchange rate. Note that this evidence only refers to direct effects not 
capturing the indirect effect of the URR on the real exchange rate through the reduction 
of capital flows. 
We estimated a similar model for Colombia including the log of the terms of trade, 
the log of net foreign assets and the log of real government expenditures as endogenous 
variables. In the context of a model with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend and   16
three lags, as indicated by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), both the trace and 
maximum-eigenvalue statistics indicate only one co-integrating vector
xi.  
Maximum-likelihood estimates of the long-run parameters are shown in Table 7. 
Contrary to the Chilean case, the likelihood ratio test for over-identifying restrictions 
strongly rejects the null of a zero long-run coefficient for the tax equivalent at 
conventional significance levels (test statistic of 23.55). In addition to being statistically 
significant, the coefficient of the URR has the correct sign, indicating that changes in the 
URR had a direct effect towards a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Therefore, the 
URR seems to affect directly the real exchange rate in the long run, in the Colombian 
case, arguably contributing toward mitigating the real exchange rate appreciation verified 
until the late 1990s.  
If we consider the short-run dynamics as characterised by the error-correction model 
presented in Table 8 (only statistically significant variables are presented), the direct 
effect of the tax equivalent on the real exchange rate is not apparent. Nonetheless, it has 
to be noted that the model presents evidence of non-normal residuals, therefore indicating 
some form of misspecification, despite the fact that heterocedasticity and autocorrelation 
seem to be ruled out by the standard tests. The fact that URR had an impact on the real 
exchange rate in Colombia, but not in Chile might suggest that markets did not perceive 
capital controls in this country to be anti-cyclical and therefore merely temporary.   17
5. Conclusion 
According to our results, there is evidence that the controls on capital inflows 
reduced total net capital flows in the case of Chile; nevertheless, they do not seem to have 
affected long-term capital flows in this country. We can reject the claims found in part of 
the literature that the URR actually increased long-term flows, while confirming the 
improvement in the maturity structure of external debt.  
The empirical evidence for Colombia suggests that the regulations have reduced 
both long-term and total flows. This result is particularly interesting as the dataset used 
for the analysis allows for the disaggregation of capital inflows according to their 
maturity, which was a major difficulty faced by the previous literature on the Colombian 
controls. In addition, the results indicate that capital flows to Colombia were less 
sensitive to changes in the tax rate than capital flows to Chile.  
Our co-integration models for real exchange rates showed that, in the case of 
Chile, the URR did not have a direct effect on the real exchange rate either in the long 
run or in the short run. Therefore, the controls on inflows only contributed towards 
reducing an excessive real exchange rate appreciation indirectly, through their effect on 
total net capital inflows. The co-integration model used for Colombia did detect a direct 
impact of the capital account regulations on the real exchange rate, in the long run, thus 
suggesting that the taxes on inflows did directly reduce the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
Thus, the results presented in this paper seem to reject claims that price-based 
capital account regulations were easily circumvented by market players and therefore 
were non-binding. Our distinct dataset and arguably more appropriate econometric 
techniques indicated that the capital account policies analyzed seem to have had 
significant macroeconomic effects on the countries studied.  
Evidently, this does not mean that the relevant authorities applied those policies 
optimally. In fact, a number of authors have emphasized failures of policymakers in the 
two countries to alter the capital controls when it was necessary to do so (see David, 2005 
for related criticisms). As an avenue for further research on the topic, one could also 
consider whether resorting to prudential regulations applicable to financial institutions or   18
corporations rather than regulating capital flows, would reduce some of the costs of such 
policies, while achieving similar benefits.  
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Table 1 
GMM Estimation of Total Net Capital Flows to Chile (1991-2000) 
t t t t t t c ε φ β δ β ω β κ β κ + + Δ + + Δ + + Δ + + = − ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( 4 3 2 1 1  
Variable Coefficient 
[P-values] 







(Capital Flows)t-1  0.407 
[0.00] 
    
Interest Differential 13.460 
[0.00] 
    
Tax Equivalent  -41.834 
[0.01] 
    
High-Yield Spread  -0.182 
[0.99] 
    
J-statistic refers to the test for the validity of instruments included for the 
estimation of the model. Normality refers to the Jarque-Bera test for the 
normality of the residuals in the regression. P-values for all the test statistics are 
presented in brackets.  
 
Table 2 
GMM Estimation of Net Long-Term Capital Flows to Chile (1991-2000) 
t t t t t t c ε φ β δ β ω β κ β κ + + Δ + + Δ + + Δ + + = − ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( 4 3 2 1 1  
Variable Coefficient 
[P-values] 







(Capital Flows)t-1  0.221 
[0.00] 
    
Interest Differential 10.745 
[0.00] 
    
Tax Equivalent  -24.768 
[0.26] 
    
High-Yield Spread  -2.385 
[0.88] 
    
J-statistic refers to the test for the validity of instruments included for the 
estimation of the model. Normality refers to the Jarque-Bera test for the 
normality of the residuals in the regression. P-values for all the test statistics are 
presented in brackets.  
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Table 3 
GMM Estimation of Total Net Capital Flows to Colombia (1993-2000) 
t t t t t t c ε φ β δ β ω β κ β κ + + Δ + + Δ + + Δ + + = − ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( 4 3 2 1 1  
Variable Coefficient 
[P-values] 







(Capital Flows)t-1  0.648 
[0.00] 
    
Interest Differential 0.594 
[0.83] 
    
Tax Equivalent  -7.472 
[0.00] 
    
High Yield Spread  -46.961 
[0.26] 
    
J-statistic refers to the test for the validity of instruments included for the 
estimation of the model. Normality refers to the Jarque-Bera test for the 
normality of the residuals in the regression. P-values for all the test statistics are 
presented in brackets.  
 
Table 4 
GMM Estimation of Net Long Term Capital Flows to Colombia (1993-2000) 
t t t t t t c ε φ β δ β ω β κ β κ + + Δ + + Δ + + Δ + + = − ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( 4 3 2 1 1  
Variable Coefficient 
[P-values] 







(Capital Flows)t-1  0.294 
[0.00] 
    
Interest Differential  -0.037 
[0.98] 
    
Tax Equivalent  -8.299 
[0.00] 
    
High Yield Spread  -0.740 
[0.98] 
    
J-statistic refers to the test for the validity of instruments included for 
the estimation of the model. Normality refers to the Jarque-Bera test 
for the normality of the residuals in the regression. P-values for all the 
test statistics are presented in brackets. 





Real Exchange Rate  1 
[None] 
Tax Equivalent  0.000 
[None] 
Government Spending  2.306 
[1.066] 
Net Foreign Assets  0.458 
[0.133] 




Overidentifying Restrictions  LR Statistic 0.003 
[p-value 0.96] 
Note: Overidentifying restriction of Zero Long-Run  
Coefficient on the Reserve Requirement was imposed.  
 
Table 6 




R-squared LM White  Normality 






Intercept  0.891 
[0.00] 
     
Δ(Real Exchange Rate)t-1  0.469 
[0.00] 
     
Δ(Tax Equivalent)t-1  0.048 
[0.66] 
     
Δ(Net Foreign Asset)t-1  0.118 
[0.01] 
     
Error Correction Term -0.114 
[0.00] 
     
World Oil Prices  -0.016 
[0.05] 
     
Dummy 1999  0.023 
[0.00] 
     
LM refers to the Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation of the residuals of the model, 
White represents the White test for heterocedasticity of the residuals, Normality is the Jarque-Bera 
test for the normality of the residuals in the regression.  P-values for all the test statistics are 
presented in brackets. The dummy variable was included to capture the end of the crawling band 
regime in September 1999.  





Real Exchange Rate  1 
[None] 
Tax Equivalent  -0.833 
[0.238] 
Government Expenditures 0.775 
[0.246] 
Net Foreign Assets  -0.263 
[0.230] 




Overidentifying Restrictions* 23.553 
[P-value 0.00] 
(*) Refers to the hypothesis that the URR coefficient is  
equal to zero in the long-run equation.  
 
Table 8 




R-squared LM White  Normality 








     
ΔRERt-1  0.415 
[0.00] 
     
ΔRERt-2  -0.310 
[0.00] 
     
ΔTax Equivalentt-1  -0.011 
[0.88] 
     
ΔGovernment Expendituret-1  0.030 
[0.10] 
     
ΔGovernment Expendituret-2  0.021 
[0.10] 
     
Error Correction Term -0.051 
[0.08] 
     
LM refers to the Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation of the residuals of the 
model, White represents the White test for heterocedasticity of the residuals, Normality is the 
Jarque-Bera test for the normality of the residuals in the regression.  P-values for all the test 
statistics are presented in brackets. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Unit-Root Tests for Chilean Variables 
 ADF-GLS  test  statistic    Ng-Perron test statistic 
Net total Flows  -1.949 (**)  -2.297(**) 
Net Long-Term Flows  -3.672 (***)  -5.318 (***) 
Net Short-term Flows  -0.800  -0.919 
Trade Balance  -4.324 (***)  -3.515 (***) 
Real Exchange Rate Gap  -5.487 (***)  -5.419 (***) 
Tax Equivalent  -0.785  -0.757 
World Oil Prices  -2.755(***)    -2.847(***) 
Terms of Trade  -1.879 (*)  -1.720 (*) 
Junk Bond Spread  -2.198 (**)    -2.205 (**) 
Real Exchange Rate  -0.950  -1.052 
Government Spending  -0.665  -0.391 
Net Foreign Assets  -1.805  -1.813 
Interest Differential  -5.261 (***)  -5.061 (***) 
(***) Denotes significance at the 1% level (**) Denotes significance at the 5% level and (*) 
significance at the 10% level. Lag selection based on Schwartz information criterion. All the 
variables were stationary in first-differences i.e. there were no I(2) variables. 
 
 
Unit-Root Tests for Colombian Variables 
 ADF-GLS  test  statistic    Ng-Perron test statistic 
Net Total Flows  -3.181 (***)  -2.911 (***) 
Net Long-Term Flows  -7.228 (***)  -4.976 (***) 
Net Short-Term Flows  -1.232  -1.224 
Interest Differential  -2.476 (**)  -1.753 (*) 
Real Exchange Rate Gap  -1.766 (*)  -9.634 (***) 
Trade Balance  -2.202 (**)  -2.108 (**) 
Real Exchange Rate  -0.936  -1.052 
Net Foreign Assets  -2.568  -0.941 
Terms of Trade  -1.497  -1.502 
Government Expenditures -0.131    0.102 
Tax Equivalent  -1.330  -1.307 
(***) Denotes significance at the 1% level (**) Denotes significance at the 5% level and (*) 
significance at the 10% level. Lag selection based on Schwartz information criterion. All the 
variables were stationary in first-differences i.e. there were no I(2) variables.   25
Appendix B 
 
  Changes in Taxes on Capital Inflows in Chile 1991-2001   
  Changes in Capital Account Regulation 
June 1991  Unremunerated Reserve Requirement Imposed at 
a Rate of 20%. Holding period equal to the 
maturity of the credit up to 12 months. 
May 1992  Holding period set to 12 months & URR 
increased to 30% for bank credit lines. 
August 1992  URR increased to 30% & Holding period fixed to 
12 month, coverage of deposits extended. 
January 1995  Holding Currency Limited to USD only. 
July 1995  URR extended to secondary ADRs. 
October 1996  FDI committee to counter evasion and re-
labelling.  
June 1998  URR reduced to 10%  
September 1998  URR set to 0% 
June 2001  Controls Eliminated. 
Source: De Gregorio et al. (2000).  
  
  Changes in Taxes on Capital Inflows in Colombia: 1993-2000   
  Changes in Capital Account Regulation 
September 1993  Deposit Requirement of 47% applied to all 
inflows of maturity under 18 months for a holding 
period of 12 months. 
March 1994  Deposit extended to all inflows of less than 36 
months maturity. Borrowers given the option to 
choose holding period and deposit rate varied 
accordingly. Reserve requirements of 93% for 12 
month deposits, 64% for 18 months deposits and 
50% for 24 months deposits. 
August 1994  Deposits extended to all foreign Loans with 
Maturity of less than 5 years. Holding period 
equal to the maturity of loan and deposit rates 
vary from 140% for loans with maturity of less 
than 1 month to 42.8% for loans with 60 months 
maturity.  
March 1996  Controls relaxed. Deposit Requirement of 50% 
and holding period of 18 months imposed on 
inflows with maturity of less than 3 years.  
March 1997  Deposit requirement extended to all flows with 
less than 5 year maturity. 
May 1997  All capital inflows subject to 30% deposit in 
Colombian Pesos with 18 month holding period. 
January 1998  Deposit Requirement Reduced to 25% and 
Holding Period to 12 months. 
September 1998  Deposit reduced to 10% and holding period to 6 
months.  
June 2000  Reserve Requirements Eliminated 
Sources: Cardenas & Barrera (1997), Rincon (1999), Central Bank of Colombia.   26
Appendix C 
 
Overview of Data & Sources 
Series Description/Notes  Source 
Domestic 
Interest Rate 
Colombia: 90-day Certificados de Deposito a Termino. 
Chile: Until April 1995 PRBC 90 rate (indexed to 
inflation) after May 1995 Overnight indexed interest 
rate.  
Chilean Central Bank Website 
(www.bcentral.cl) and 
Colombian Central Bank Website 
(www.banrep.gov.co).  
Trade Balance  Export of goods and services minus imports in Logs.   Author’s Calculations from raw 




  Chilean Central Bank Website 
(www.bcentral.cl) and 








  Chilean Central Bank Website 
(www.bcentral.cl) and 




Cyclical Component of Real Exchange Rate, obtained 
by fitting a structural time series model (Kalman Filter) 
to real exchange rate series.  
Author’s Calculations.  
Country Risk 
Premium 
Chile: premium on international bonds issued by 
Chilean corporations. Colombia: Series constructed 
using spread of Colombian bonds in international 
markets over US T-bills. Updated using EMBI+ until 
2002 
Central Bank of Chile, Rincon & 
Villar (2000) & J.P. Morgan, 
obtained from Thomson’s 
Datastream. 
Terms of Trade    Bennett & Valdes (2001) & 












Difference in Yields between US High-Yield Bonds and 
10-Year US Treasury Bonds. A number of different 
High-Yield indexes where used such as Master II 
(H0A0) and High Yield 175 (X0A0) 
Merrill Lynch, obtained from 
Thomson’s Datastream. 
World Oil Price 
Index 
 IMF’s  International  Financial 
Statistics Database.  








We experimented with a number of distinct differentials. 
Generally calculated as difference between the reference 
rate, the US interest Rate, the nominal exchange rate 
devaluation (actual, past and forward rates were used 
alternatively) and the country risk spread. 
Author’s Calculations   27
 
                                                 
i In mid-1995, for instance, the controls were extended, especially to secondary market ADRs and portfolio 
flows in order to close loopholes and make the regulations more restrictive Nonetheless, it is widely 
recognised in the literature that after those extensions FDI became a channel for the entrance of portfolio 
flows, which suggests an element of mere change of labels regarding the composition of flows. Despite this 
fact, there is no evidence that evasion of the capital account regulations was not merely marginal. Gallego 
et al. (2002) estimate that in the whole 1991-1998 period the total reserve deposit implied by the URR was 
on average 1.9% of Chile’s GDP. 
ii In order to obtain a rough estimate of the importance of U.S. capital flows to Chile, consider that bank 
loans from the U.S. amounted to 46% of total bank loans to Chile in 1994 according to BIS data and 
between 1990 and 1999 an average of 49.1% of Chilean long-term debt was denominated in U.S. dollars 
according to World Bank’s GDF data. In addition, 24.5% of total bank loans to Colombia originated in the 
U.S. in 1994 according to BIS data and 57.5% of Colombia’s total long-term debt was denominated in U.S. 
dollars on average during 1990-1999 period, according to the World Bank’s GDF dataset. 
iii In addition, regarding the data on short-term flows, one has to note that “Banks include their liabilities 
and claims on foreign branches and other affiliates that arise out of normal banking business; brokers and 
dealers exclude items that represent inter-company balances. Also excluded from all respondents' reports 
are direct investments, positions arising from equity securities and debt issues with original maturity of 
more than one year, contingent items; and off-balance sheet contracts, including unsettled spot and 
forward foreign exchange contracts, options, and warrants” (see the TIC website at www.ustreas.gov). 
iv Some authors tried to take into account the fact that players in financial markets will try to evade the 
regulations imposed and therefore the restrictions would “loose power” some time after implemented. De 
Gregorio et al. (2000) and Gallego et al. (2002) constructed an index that takes the value of 1 each time a 
new regulation is implemented (or the scope of previous regulations extended) and decays thereafter. The 
rate of decay chosen is purely arbitrary in those cases. 
v The results reported are robust to different definitions of the tax equivalent. 
vi The sample period was chosen to ensure that we use data over a single policy regime (to avoid structural 
breaks) and because of data availability. 
vii Once again, the sample period was chosen because of data availability and to avoid structural breaks. 
viii One has to bear in mind that it is important to estimate the co-integration relationships using data from a 
single macroeconomic policy regime, since it is likely that the parameters of the co-integration relationship 
would be unstable otherwise. There is a serious risk of inconsistency of estimates when the wrong co-
integration relationships are imposed, since imposing wrong co-integration parameters will make the 
system converge to an incorrect equilibrium in the long run and also bias short-run dynamics. 
ix In order to account for the move towards a floating exchange rate regime. 
x The critical values were 43.7 and 97.2 respectively, indicating rejection of the null hypothesis of no co-
integration at the 5% level. The null of at most 1 co-integration relationship was not rejected (critical values 
24.8 and 53.5). 
xi The critical values were 42.9 and 91.1 respectively, indicating rejection of the null hypothesis of no co-
integration at the 5% level. The null of at most 1 co-integration relationship was not rejected (critical values 
22.9 and 48.1).  